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Empty Laws Make for Empty Stomachs: Hollow Public
Housing Laws in Utah and Other States Force the
Nation’s Poor to Choose Between Adequate Housing and
Life’s Other Necessities
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 8, the projects, vouchers, rental assistance, affordable
housing, the tax credit, low-income housing and moderate-income
housing are all words or terms used to describe forms of public housing.
Public housing programs are designed to provide housing or housing
assistance to persons and families with very low to moderate income, to
elderly persons, and to persons with disabilities.1 Public housing units
range anywhere from high-rise apartments to single family houses. The
United States has roughly 1.3 million households living in public
housing units.2 These public housing units are managed by about 3,300
Housing Authorities.3 These Housing Authorities are able to fund public
housing through aid received from the federal government. With these
federal funds, and private funds contributed through various housing
programs, Housing Authorities generally subsidize rent payments by
distributing funds to either landlords or tenants of these housing units,
according to plans whereby the tenants pay no more than 30 percent of
their adjusted annual income for housing.4
While federal law encourages states to address the need for public
housing, states, in turn, may require as much from their municipalities.5
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (“the Housing Act”), the federal government

1. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development [hereinafter HUD],
HUD’s Public Housing Program, http://www.hud.gov/renting/phprog.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
Some of these terms, particularly lower-income and public housing, are used interchangeably
throughout this article.
2. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) estimates
that there are an additional 2.7 million renter households who receive housing assistance. See JOINT
CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY [hereinafter JCHS], THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING 2006 29 (2006), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2006/
son2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2007). In addition to rental assistance programs, HUD has a number
of programs to assist qualifying families in purchasing and owning their own homes. For a complete
list of HUD’s housing assistance programs, see HUD, Homes and Communities, http://www.hud.
gov/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
3. See JCHS, supra note 2, at 29.
4. Id.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000); U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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uses its authority, based on the general welfare rationale, to legislate on
local housing matters, an area traditionally left to states’ police power.6
The purpose of this article is to describe the nation’s need for public
housing and demonstrate that, aside from California and Massachusetts
whose laws provide a concrete framework whereby developers or cities
desiring to build public housing may do so, state laws are insufficient at
making certain that public housing is actually erected unless the city and
the developer both share a goal to do so. Part II gives a brief background
of how the United States’ rapid development was a substantial factor in
the need to create the very first public housing laws and that rapid
development continues to press lawmakers to address housing issues.
Part III discusses government programs that provide funds for the
erection or redevelopment of public housing, including the HOPE VI and
Low Income Housing Tax Credit programs that encourage private parties
to work with government agencies to help with such funding. Part IV
discusses various techniques that can be employed by the government to
encourage the construction of public housing. Part V discusses how a
few specific state and municipal laws affect the actual development of
lower-income housing, including how state laws in both California and
Massachusetts have the highest likelihood of actually affecting the
erection of public housing by providing a framework under which the
development of affordable housing is not only more worthwhile and
plausible, but more lucrative and beneficial. Part VI demonstrates how
municipalities implement state requirements though a discussion of
Utah’s state and municipal housing codes. Utah’s laws are particularly
telling because even though some municipalities in Utah actually claim
to have no shortage of public housing, statistical studies show that many
residents lack adequate housing and could benefit drastically from more
specific state housing laws. Finally, Part VII gives a brief evaluation of
how and whether state and municipal laws affect the development of
public housing.

6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437; see also Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 387 (1926) (All local zoning ordinances “must find their justification in some aspect of the
police power, asserted for the public welfare.”). Though the federal government cannot require states
to enact specific housing ordinances, it is the policy of the federal government “to promote the
general welfare of the Nation by employing the funds and credit of the Nation . . . [and] to assist
States and political subdivisions of States to address the shortage of housing affordable to lowincome families.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1). Thus, because the federal government has the authority to
utilize the nation’s funds to encourage the development of lower-income housing, by implication, it
may withhold the nation’s funds to those states and political subdivisions of states who do not
address the shortage of affordable housing. So while the federal government does not necessarily
have the “authority” to legislate on local housing matters, it has such authority to legislate on general
welfare matters, and correspondingly encourage local legislation on housing matters through either
disbursing or withholding federal funds.
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II. BACKGROUND
The rapid development of the United States has always been a
contributing factor to the need for public housing. Public housing
policies in the United States can, for the most part, be traced back to the
rapid expansion of the late 19th century.7 In a nation fast developing, due
in large part to transient immigrants working to improve their social
status in an era of economic uncertainty, the government passed
aggressive anti-vagrancy laws to curtail some of the increasing social
difficulties related to the nation’s rapid growth.8 One such law went so
far as to make homelessness a crime punishable by incarceration.9 In
response to such far-reaching laws, trade unions and other workers
lobbied local governments to build some of the nation’s earliest public
housing.10
A few decades later, the Great Depression created new and more
severe problems with homelessness and again evoked a governmental
response, which became the backdrop for today’s public housing
policies.11 As “massive layoffs were swiftly followed by widespread
evictions,” unemployed councils emerged and advocated not only
improved social and economic conditions, but cooperation between
social groups and political powers to strike at the core of housing
problems.12 When the Depression made it difficult for vagrant workers
and entire families alike to find suitable housing, President Franklin
Roosevelt’s “New Deal” allowed Congress to pass a series of acts aimed
at alleviating such difficulties. One such Act was the Housing Act of
1937, which was designed in part to aid low-income families in their
search for suitable housing.13 Seventy years later, the Housing Act is still
part of the United States Code.14 This law continues to have as one of its
stated goals, the assistance of “[s]tates and political subdivisions of
[s]tates to address the shortage of housing affordable to low-income

7. See Maria Foscarinis et al., The Human Right to Housing: Making the Case in U.S.
Advocacy, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 97, 112 (2004).
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. See id. (citing DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS
IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 87-89 (1993)).
11. See generally HARRELL R. RODERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, (JAI
Press 1984).
12. See Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 112.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000).
14. Id.
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families.”15
More recently, another area of rapid development has had a huge
affect on the need to address public housing in the United States: the
housing market. With housing costs booming and household incomes on
the decline, it is as difficult or more difficult today for a low- to
moderate-income family to purchase a house than ever before.16 While
“the generally accepted definition of affordability is for a household to
pay no more than thirty percent of its annual income on housing,”17
thirty-three percent of all American households spend more than thirty
percent of their annual income on housing18 and ninety-five percent of
homeowners with yearly incomes less than $20,000 have to exceed the
thirty percent benchmark.19 With shortages of affordable housing, these
families may be left to choose between paying rent and paying for other
necessities such as “food, clothing, transportation and medical care.”20
So how do these persons afford housing without sacrificing other
necessities of life? Realistically, many do not. Although the American
dream of home ownership is at an all-time high in the United States,21
this dream is often intertwined with sleepless nights brought about
because many homeowners sacrifice life’s other necessities to achieve
it.22 While some persons and families decide to sacrifice food, insurance,
housing location, and other wants or needs in order to live this American
dream, others turn to public housing.
Currently, individuals and families qualify for public housing if they

15. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (a)(1)(b) (2000).
16. See Stephen Ohlemacher, Housing Costs Taking Bigger Bite, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City), Oct. 3, 2006, at A02 (asserting that it is much more difficult now for buyers to get
into the housing market because median home values have gone up thirty-two percent over the last
five years while household income has declined 2.8% in that same time period).
17. HUD, Affordable Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/index.cfm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
18. See JCHS, supra note 2, at 25.
19. See Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, Traffic, Housing Costs Force Commuters to Alter
Routine, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2006, at A4, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/
2006-10-02-commuter-routine_x.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
20. HUD, supra note 17 (“Families who pay more than 30 percent of their income for
housing are considered cost burdened and may have difficulty affording necessities such as food,
clothing, transportation and medical care.”); see also JCHS, supra note 2, at 26.
21. Noelle Knox, Fewer families can afford a home, USA Today, March 21, 2006, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2006-03-21-families-real-estate-usat_x.htm
(last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (“Nearly 70% of Americans own their homes, a record high, but the rate
of homeownership for working families with children is lower than in 1978.”).
22. See HUD, supra note 17 (“An estimated 12 million renter and homeowner households
now pay more than 50 percent of their annual incomes for housing . . . . The lack of affordable
housing is a significant hardship for low-income households preventing them from meeting their
other basic needs, such as nutrition and healthcare, or saving for their future and that of their
families.”).
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have very low- or low-income.23 HUD defines very low-income
individuals and families as those who earn less than fifty percent of the
median income in the area in which they live and low-income individuals
and families as those who earn fifty to eighty percent of the median
income in their area.24 However, just because a family qualifies for
public housing doesn’t necessarily mean they will receive assistance.
Though there are roughly 16 million very low-income households who
rent housing in the United States, only about 4 million of these
households receive housing assistance.25 With the rapid rise in the real
estate market and lack of a corresponding rise in income,26 many
individuals and families simply close their eyes to the American dream
of purchasing and owning their own home and turn to local, state, and
federal governments for assistance in finding suitable housing. Some
scholars believe that without financial support from the government, “it
might well be that decent housing is simply beyond the reach of the
poor.”27 Thus, the increase in home prices creates the motivation for
local governments to provide housing assistance so people can meet even
their most basic need of shelter. Accordingly, states and municipalities
attempt to introduce ways to provide public housing for those low- to
moderate-income individuals and families who have been priced out of
suitable housing and who qualify for housing assistance, but are still
denied adequate housing not simply because federal funding is
unavailable,28 but because there are not enough affordable housing units.

23. See HUD, HUD’s Public Housing Program, http://www.hud.gov/renting/phprog.cfm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2007).
24. See id.
25. See JCHS, supra note 2, at 29 (“HUD estimates that over four million renter households
with incomes less than half of area medians now receive housing assistance, but this number
represents only about a quarter of renters with incomes that low.”).
26. See Ohlemacher, supra note 16, at A02.
27. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 449 (6th ed. 2006).
28. Though insufficient funding is an obstacle to providing public housing, the limited scope
of this article does not cover these funding concerns in depth.

500

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

III. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS COORDINATE HOUSING FUNDS
A variety of government-sponsored programs assist lower-income
persons and families in finding adequate housing. Although there are
literally dozens of programs,29 only those most often employed are
discussed here in detail.
A. Section 8
Section 8, which gets its name and authority from Section 8 of the
United States Housing Act of 1937,30 is a project-based program that
currently assists more than 1.3 million persons in obtaining suitable
housing.31 Under Section 8, the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (“HUD”) contracts with owners of multi-family
housing developments to provide housing to very low- to low-income
individuals and families.32 Typically, these very low- to low-income
individuals and families pay the highest of either thirty percent of their
adjusted income, ten percent of their gross income, or the allotted
amount of their welfare payments to the housing owners, and the federal
government makes up the difference for whatever the fair market value
of the unit may be.33
B. Vouchers
Two types of vouchers, also known as Certificates, currently serve as

29. See generally HUD, PROGRAMS OF HUD (2005), http://www.huduser.org/whatsnew/
ProgramsHUD05.pdf (providing a comprehensive overview of all HUD’s major programs).
30. See id. at 74 (“Legal Authority: Section 8 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C.
1437(f).”).
31. See id. at 72.
32. See id.
33. See HUD’s Public Housing Program, http://www.hud.gov/renting/phprog.cfm (last
visited on Mar. 5, 2007) (“The Total Tenant Payment (TTP) in this program, would be based on your
family’s anticipated gross annual income less deductions, if any. HUD regulations allow HAs to
exclude from annual income the following allowances: $480 for each dependent; $400 for any
elderly family, or a person with a disability; and some medical deductions for families headed by an
elderly person or a person with disabilities. Based on your application, the HA representative will
determine if any of the allowable deductions should be subtracted from your annual income. Annual
income is the anticipated total income from all sources received from the family head and spouse,
and each additional member of the family 18 years of age or older.
The formula used in determining the TTP is the highest of the following, rounded to the
nearest dollar:
(1) 30 percent of the monthly adjusted income. (Monthly Adjusted Income is annual
income less deductions allowed by the regulations);
(2) 10 percent of monthly income;
(3) welfare rent, if applicable; or
(4) a $25 minimum rent or higher amount (up to $50) set by an HA.”).

495]

HOLLOW PUBLIC HOUSING LAWS

501

Section 8’s main programs for funding lower-income housing: projectand tenant-based vouchers.34 The federal government provides funding
for vouchers to local Public Housing Authorities (“PHAs”). PHAs then
distribute these funds in the form of vouchers to either landlords or
tenants of lower-income housing.35 Project-based vouchers provide
rental subsidies for lower-income persons and families “who live in
specified housing developments or units,”36 while tenant-based vouchers
provide similar subsidies while allowing the qualified individual or
family to choose their housing from the private market.37 Vouchers can
also come in the form of home-ownership voucher assistance and
enhanced voucher assistance.38 Through home-ownership vouchers and
enhanced vouchers respectively, PHAs distribute vouchers to help with
monthly expenses incurred by first-time homeowners and families who
have been adversely affected by a HUD housing decision, such as a
decision to terminate a project-based voucher for the housing project in
which the family lived.39
While vouchers have served as the main avenue for funding public
housing, federal funding for public housing has dropped dramatically
over the last thirty years.40 With the drop in federal financing, the federal
government has initiated programs aimed at encouraging private
individuals and organizations (profit and not-for profit) to invest in
developing lower-income housing. The most significant such programs
today are HOPE VI and the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.41

34. See id. at 73–77.
35. Id.
36. See HUD, supra note 29, at 76.
37. See id. at 73–75. (At least seventy-five percent of funds granted to Public Housing
Authorities for vouchers must go to families with incomes less than thirty percent of the area median
income. Up to twenty percent of these funds may be distributed through project-based vouchers.)
38. See id. at 74.
39. See id.
40. See Foscarinis, supra note 7, at 103 (citing CUSHING DOLBEARE & SHEILA CROWLEY,
NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, CHANGING PRIORITIES: THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND
HOUSING ASSISTANCE 1976-2007 (2002), http://www.nlihc.org/doc/changingpriorities.pdf)
(“Between 1976 and 2002 budget authority for federal housing assistance dropped by $28.1 billion.
In January 1977 the Ford administration submitted to Congress a budget request for the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that would have funded 506,000 additional
low-income housing units. Subsidized housing commitments dropped to 60,590 in 1982, to 33, 491
in 1995, and to 8,493 in 1996.”).
41. See HUD, ABOUT HOPE VI, at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/
index.cfm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (“The HOPE VI program serves a vital role in the Department
of Housing and Urban Development’s efforts to transform Public Housing.”); HUD USER, LowIncome Housing Tax Credits, http://www.huduser.org/datasets/lihtc.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2007)
(“The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is the most important resource for creating
affordable housing in the United States Today.”).
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C. HOPE VI
HOPE VI is a program that encourages PHAs to form “partnerships
with private entities to establish mixed-finance and mixed-income
affordable housing.”42 In 1989, in response to the growth of ghettos
caused by the grouping of lower-income housing developments together,
Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed
Public Housing (“the Commission”) and invited the Commission to
develop a plan to eradicate severely distressed public housing by the year
2000.43 Shortly thereafter, the Commission introduced the HOPE VI
program. Under HOPE VI, the federal government gives grants to aid
PHAs44 for a variety of projects aimed at renovating and rejuvenating
downtown and main street areas of distressed cities.45 “The activities
permitted under HOPE VI include, but are not limited to: the capital
costs of demolition, major reconstruction, rehabilitation, and other
physical improvements; the provision of replacement housing;
management improvements; planning and technical assistance; and the
provision of supportive services (including the funding, beginning in
Fiscal Year 2000, of an endowment trust for supportive services).”46
Since its inception, HOPE VI has been the source of over five billion
dollars in grants.47 As of 2006, the HOPE VI program continues to play a
“vital role” in transforming the image and placement of public housing
from ghettos and slums to non-poverty neighborhoods and mixed-income
communities.48
42. HUD, supra note 29, at 80.
43. See id.
44. PHAs match at least five percent of funds given through such grants. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See HUD, Revitalization Grants, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/
grants/revitalization/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2007); HUD, HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANTS 16
(2006), http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/rev_grants_all.pdf.
48. HUD, About HOPE VI, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/
index.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007); see also HUD, BEAUMONT, TX FY 2006 HOPE VI
REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS 1 (2006), http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/
grants/revitalization/06/beaumont.pdf (outlining the Beaumont, Texas Housing Authority’s HOPE
VI grant and its uses); HUD, EASTON, PA FY 2006 HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS 1
(2006),
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/06/easton.pdf
(outlining the Easton, Pennsylvania Housing Authority’s HOPE VI grant and its uses); HUD,
KINGSPORT, TN FY 2006 HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS 1 (2006),
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/06/kingsport.pdf (outlining
the Kingsport, Tennessee Housing Authority’s HOPE VI grant and its uses); HUD, NIAGARA FALLS,
NY FY 2006 HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANT AWARDS 1 (2006), http://www.hud.gov/
offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/06/niagara.pdf (outlining the Niagara Falls, New
York Housing Authority’s HOPE VI grant and its uses); HUD, BURRILLVILLE, RHODE ISLAND,
MAIN STREET REDEVELOPMENT 1, http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/
fy06/burrillville.pdf (describing the effects of a HOPE VI grant upon the Burrillville community);
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D. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
The low-income housing tax credit (the “Tax Credit”) program was
created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and stands today as the most
important resource for providing lower-income housing in the United
States.49 The Tax Credit program is a joint effort made by the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) and state housing agencies to provide an
incentive for taxpayers to invest in lower-income housing.50 The Tax
Credit is a dollar for dollar credit that lowers a taxpayer’s federal income
tax liability in exchange for a promise to provide lower-income housing
for at least thirty years—fifteen under the jurisdiction of the IRS and
fifteen under the jurisdiction of the state agency.51 The Tax Credit can be
given to support the full range of lower-income housing projects and has
been used to attract investments from banks, utility companies, and other
corporate and individual investors as a means of fostering good
community relations and “seek[ing] an attractive return on equity.”52
Together with the HOPE VI program, the Tax Credit program has been
effective in providing housing to the lower-income housing market53 in a
way that the government can no longer afford to do on its own.54 As
effective as these programs have been over the last twenty years,
however, they simply have not been enough to provide housing for the
majority of lower-income families who qualify for housing assistance.55
This is evidenced by the fact that roughly seventy-five percent of veryHUD, National Fact Sheet, Fiscal Year 2006 HOPE VI Revitalization Grant Awards,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/06/06nationalfactsheet.pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (Municipalities and developers currently have plans to demolish 659
severely distressed housing units and erect 799 new affordable housing units with 2006 HOPE VI
funds.).
49. See HUD USER, supra note 41; Wayne H. Hykan, Pricing the Equity of a Tax Credit
Project: An Institutional Investor’s Perspective, Handout distributed at the Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law Section’s Fourth Annual Fall CLE Meeting held in Denver, Colorado (Oct. 2006) (on
file with author).
50. See Internal Revenue Service, IRC § 42: the Low-Income Housing Credit in Summary,
Low Income Housing Credit Newsletter Issue No. 22 (Sep. 2006).
51. See id.
52. Id. (“The credit supports a variety of housing opportunities. The taxpayer can build new
housing, or acquire and rehabilitate existing housing. The housing can be apartments, single-family
housing, single-occupancy rooms, or even transitional housing for the homeless. The property may
be mixed affordable and market rate rental units or a portion of the property may be for commercial
use.”); see also Hykan, supra note 49.
53. See HUD USER, supra note 41.
54. JCHS, supra note 2, at 29 (“Prospects for a turnaround are bleak. After nearly 20 years of
increases, growth in federal housing assistance ground to a halt in the second half of the 1990s. The
federal government, which has historically provided the lion’s share of subsidies, now faces a
massive budget deficit and is looking for ways to fund the rising costs of international and domestic
security.”).
55. See JCHS, supra note 2, at 29.
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low income individuals and families do not receive any form of housing
assistance.56
Although the Section 8, Vouchers, Tax Credit and HOPE VI
programs have made important contributions to the lower-income
housing market, unless more efforts are made by states, municipalities,
and developers to bolster the market’s shortage of housing affordable to
persons and families with low to moderate income, such shortage will
remain and these persons and families will be left to choose between
adequate housing and other necessities of life.57 The remainder of this
article focuses on how housing laws enacted by states and municipalities
affect the amount and location of available public housing units.
IV. THE EFFECT OF HOUSING LAWS ON THE ERECTION OF PUBLIC
HOUSING
A. Authority to Create Housing Laws
Most states have enacted housing laws that give their municipalities
an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for the development of
affordable housing.58 This obligation includes the responsibility to
“promulgat[e] appropriate land use ordinances under which a developer
can be expected to construct” affordable housing.59 The obligation and
authority to enact such land use ordinances at the federal and state levels
derive from federal law60 and from state police power,61 respectively.
With such obligation and authority, municipalities, under the direction of
states, generally utilize one or more techniques to accomplish housing
objectives ranging from combating discrimination effected by
exclusionary zoning practices to affirmatively requiring the development
of low- to moderate-income housing through inclusionary and incentive
56. See id. (“HUD estimates that over four million renter households with incomes less than
half of area medians now receive housing assistance, but this number represents only about a quarter
of renters with incomes that low. The low-income housing tax credit has helped to meet some of this
shortfall by stimulating the production or rehabilitation of about 1.8 million affordable rentals since
1987. But even the scale of this program has not been enough to keep the affordable rental inventory
from shrinking.”).
57. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
58. See 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 78 (2006).
59. Id.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000); see also Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82
Stat. 81 (1968) (exemplifying how the federal government can exercise the authority to enact laws
for the general welfare of its citizens).
61. DAVID A. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 537 (4th ed. 2004)
(“[A] municipality exercises the state’s police power, not its own”); see also Euclid v. Amber Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (All local zoning ordinances “must find their justification in some
aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”).
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zoning.62
B. Exclusionary and Inclusionary Zoning.
1. Exclusionary zoning
Exclusionary zoning is land use planning that has as its purpose,
result, or effect “a form of economic segregation by restricting land
usage . . . to block, or at least limit, the influx . . . of persons having low
or moderate incomes” into a community or municipality.63 Often this
entails blocking or limiting the influx of racial minorities, as “issues of
racial segregation are not always completely separable from those of
economic segregation, particularly when it is taken into account that a
very large percentage of lower income families are members of racial
minorities.”64 Exclusionary zoning generally occurs when a municipality
enacts an ordinance that either sets a minimum lot or house size, which
increases the cost of housing, or restricts or prohibits the erection of
multi-family housing or manufactured homes.65 Courts have recognized
the danger of this type of discrimination since the introduction of land
use controls,66 but have not completely eliminated exclusionary zoning
because many exclusionary techniques can be justified by an appeal to
public health, safety, morals, welfare, or even aesthetic considerations,67
which theories, coincidentally, are loosely related to the rationale under
which the federal government justifies its legislation on public housing
matters.68
In addition to these exclusionary justifications, two other notable
obstacles make challenging exclusionary zoning difficult. First, the
62. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 61, at 548–49.
63. J. R. Kempler, Annotation, Exclusionary Zoning, 48 A.L.R.3D 1210 § 1[a] (1973).
64. Id.
65. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 61, at 535–36.
66. See id. at 534 (citing Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 Fed. 307, 316
(D.C.Ohio 1924) rev’d 272 U.S. 365 (1926)) (municipal ordinance was invalidated in part because it
segregated the population according to income or status); see also Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem,
6 S.E.2d 867, 870 (N.C. 1940) (“We are presently concerned . . . with municipal restrictions upon
the use and occupancy of property as affected solely by the racial status of the proposed occupant.”)
67. See Kempler, supra note 63, § 1[b]; see also Pierro v. Baxendale, 118 A.2d 401, 407
(N.J. 1955) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)) (“The concept of the public welfare
is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into
account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation’s capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437.

506

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

requirement that plaintiffs have standing often bars litigation brought by
anyone not holding a legal or equitable interest in property that is
adversely affected by the ordinance.69 Second, legislative deference,
creates a presumption that the ordinance is valid and constitutional and
will be upheld as such unless a challenging party satisfies a very high
burden of proof.70
In spite of these obstacles, plaintiffs have successfully challenged
zoning ordinances as exclusionary on numerous occasions. The most
notable challenges are Mount Laurel I71 and Mount Laurel II,72 which
together established the “fair share” doctrine, under which not only is
exclusionary zoning prohibited, but municipalities must demonstrate that
they provide their fair share of the necessary low- to moderate-income
housing in the area.73 The Mount Laurel cases rejected “an ordinance
permitting only single-family detached dwellings” and restricting
“minimum lot area, lot frontage and building size requirements so as to
preclude single-family housing” for moderate and lower-income families
because it was contrary to the general welfare.74
In Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court established “the
doctrine requiring that municipalities’ land use regulations provide a
realistic opportunity for low- and moderate-income housing.”75 After
eight years of virtual non-compliance with the Mount Laurel I decision,
the New Jersey Supreme Court revisited Mount Laurel in an attempt to
“put some steel into” its earlier holding.76 In Mt. Laurel II, the court
69. See Kempler, supra note 63, § 2.
70. See id.; Kaahumanu v. County of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003) (courts
determine whether an action is legislative by considering four factors: (1) whether the act involves
ad hoc decision making, or the formulation of policy; (2) whether the act applies to a few
individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act is formally legislative in character; and (4)
whether it bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. The act is generally considered legislative
if it formulates policy, applies to the public at large, is formally legislative, and bears hallmarks of
traditional legislation. (citing Bechard v. Rappold, 287 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir.2002)).
71. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mt. Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975) (Holding that “a developing municipality may not, by a system of land use regulation,
make it physically and economically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing in the
municipality for various categories of persons who need and want it.”).
72. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mt. Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983) (Holding that municipalities have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for
housing, not simply for the opportunity to litigate for public housing.).
73. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724.
74. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713; Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390.
75. Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 409–10.
76. Id. at 410 (“The Mount Laurel case itself threatens to become infamous. After all this
time, ten years after the trial court’s initial order invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel
remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by
hired experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel’s determination to
exclude the poor. . . .
To the best of our ability, we shall not allow it to continue. This Court is more firmly committed to
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noted that not a single lower-income housing unit had been built since its
earlier decision.77 In response to such inaction, the court established, in
explicit detail and by way of a 120-page opinion, what New Jersey
municipalities must do to fulfill their responsibility of providing a
realistic opportunity for building low-income housing.78 The decision not
only gave trial courts the authority to revise a municipality’s zoning
ordinance upon the determination that the municipality had not fulfilled
its regional fair-share obligation, but also the authority to require
affirmative planning and zoning devices such as lower-income density
bonuses and mandatory set-asides.79 Thus, not only had legislative
deference been overcome in the courts, but courts (in New Jersey) could
now exercise authority over legislation to require it to abide by judicial
standards.80 Only a handful of states, however, have followed New
Jersey’s aggressive jurisprudence.81
In response to the Mt. Laurel II decision, the New Jersey Legislature
implemented the Mt. Laurel doctrine by enacting the Fair Housing Act
and establishing the Council on Affordable Housing.82 Other states soon
followed, enacting statutes requiring municipalities to provide their fairthe original Mount Laurel doctrine than ever, and we are determined, within appropriate judicial
bounds, to make it work. The obligation is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not
litigation. We have learned from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial hand is used,
Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals. We
intend by this decision to strengthen it, clarify it, and make it easier for public officials, including
judges, to apply it.
This case . . . involve[s] questions arising from the Mount Laurel doctrine . . . [and]
demonstrate[s] the need to put some steel into that doctrine. . . . The waste of judicial energy
involved at every level is substantial and is matched only by the often needless expenditure of
talent on the part of lawyers and experts.”).
77. See 13 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79D.07[3][b], 79D–367
(Michael Allen Wolf ed., Matthew Bender 2000) (citing Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 461) (“Nothing
has really changed since the date of our first opinion, either in Mount Laurel or in its land use
regulations. The record indicates that the Township continues to thrive with added industry, some
new businesses, and continued growth of middle, upper middle, and upper income housing. As far as
lower income housing is concerned, from the date of that opinion to today (as far as the record
before us shows) no one has yet constructed one unit of lower income housing—nor has anyone
even tried to. Mount Laurel’s lower income housing effort has been either a total failure or a total
success—depending on its intention.” (citations omitted)).
78. See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390.
79. See id. at 445.
80. Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390.
81. See, e.g., Britton v. Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (N.H. 1991) (court found ordinance
restricting development of multi-family housing invalid and unconstitutional because it ran afoul of
the statutory requirement that ordinances promote general welfare of community); Save a Valuable
Env’t v. Bothell, 576 P.2d 401, 405 (Wash. 1978) (court found action of city in rezoning parcel from
farmland to permit construction of shopping center arbitrary and capricious because the city failed to
serve the welfare of community as a whole); Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466,
468 (Pa. 1975) (court found zoning ordinance which provided for apartment construction in only 80
of the 11,589 acres in township was unconstitutionally exclusionary).
82. See Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT ANN. § 52:27D-301 (West 1985).
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share of lower-income housing.83 Included in many of these ordinances
were some of the affirmative devices suggested by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel II, such as lower-income density bonuses
and mandatory set-asides.84 These affirmative zoning devices, which are
calculated to encourage and often require a municipality to provide for
its fair-share of lower-income housing, are commonly referred to as
“inclusionary zoning.”85
2. Inclusionary zoning
Inclusionary zoning can generally be broken down into two types:
incentive zoning, under which municipalities offer one or more
incentives to entice developers to erect lower-income units within or very
near to the municipalities, and mandatory set-asides, also known by the
generic title “inclusionary zoning,” under which developers must set
aside a number of lower-income housing units in order to develop within
a municipality.86
a. Incentive zoning. Incentive zoning generally takes the form of
“the relaxation of certain restrictions in a zoning ordinance in return for
the provision by a developer of a specified amount of lower-income
housing units.”87 An example of such zoning would be when a specific
area of the municipality is zoned to have a maximum density of ten
multi-family housing units per acre. Without incentive zoning, a
developer would be able to develop one hundred such units within a tenacre area. Under incentive zoning, however, a municipality relaxes the
maximum density to allow a developer to erect one-hundred twenty-five
units, provided that twenty of those units are set aside as lower-income
housing units.88 Under this example, the developer has the option of
building the additional 20 lower-income units, along with five bonus
market-rate units, whereas under mandatory inclusionary zoning,
discussed shortly, the developer must construct the lower-income units in
order to erect any units in the municipality.
The theory behind incentive zoning is that allowing a developer to
erect additional market-rate units will compensate him for the erection of
lower-income units.89 The key issue here is striking the balance between
83. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes and citations.
84. See id.
85. 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, §§
22.22–22.23 (4th ed. West 2006).
86. See Id.
87. Id. at § 22.22.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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offering too little incentive to developers, who then refuse to develop
lower-income units, and offering too much incentive to developers,
whereby planning and zoning principles that have been established for
the health, safety, and general welfare of the people are violated for the
sake of providing affordable housing for a minority of the population.90
While any exception to zoning criterion technically violates zoning
principles that are calculated to best promote the health, safety, and
general welfare of the community as a whole, smaller exceptions, while
affecting zoning principles and the general welfare negatively to some
extent, might have greater general welfare benefits that outweigh the
resulting negatives.91 If municipalities over-incentivize, however, there is
a decreasing marginal benefit gained by such a drastic increase of
affordable housing and the resulting gains might not outweigh the
negative effects to general welfare.92
Even though a developer may be able to construct more market-rate
units, disincentives may dissuade him from doing so, especially in light
of the fact that incentive zoning is voluntary. Clearly, when lowerincome housing units are erected, other market-rate units erected
alongside such units will not be as enticing to non lower-income persons
and families, making the value of the otherwise market-rate units fall
below market rate. Though incentive zoning may be successful at
erecting public housing if both municipality and developer share such a
goal, if only one of the parties, usually the municipality, has the desire to
erect lower-income housing, it is unlikely that such housing will be built.
In fact, some scholars have deemed incentive zoning “totally
unsuccessful” because developers will not leave their comfort zone (and
likely their zone of expertise) of traditional development and take the
risks that can be associated with an uncertain area of development.93
Thus, municipalities seeking to develop lower-income housing without
sacrificing more health, safety, or general welfare goals than necessary,

90. See id. at n.3 (California’s plan successfully combines regulatory and financial incentives
by requiring “local governments [to] grant a twenty-five percent housing density bonus or similar
incentive to developers of five or more units who set aside at least twenty-five percent of their units
for low and moderate income persons.”).
91. Id. at §22:22.
92. Id.
93. Id. See also Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 445-46 (citing Fox & Davis, Density Bonus
Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1060-62
(1976)) (“Incentive zoning leaves a developer free to build only upper income housing if it so
chooses. Fox and Davis, in their survey of municipalities using inclusionary devices, found that
while developers sometimes profited through density bonuses, they were usually reluctant to
cooperate with incentive zoning programs; and that therefore those municipalities that relied
exclusively on such programs were not very successful in actually providing lower income
housing.”).
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can turn to firmer policies, commonly known as mandatory inclusionary
zoning.
b. Mandatory inclusionary zoning. Mandatory inclusionary zoning,
which usually comes in the form of set-asides, requires developers to
commit to constructing a certain number of lower-income units or
otherwise providing for lower-income units in a municipality before they
are able to develop in the municipality.94 Residential developers are
generally required to set aside anywhere from ten to twenty-five percent
of a development for lower-income housing.95 Commercial developers
are often required to contribute to a lower-income housing fund that is
used to develop lower-income housing units.96 As with incentive zoning,
municipalities try to soften the blow to developers by providing some
sort of compensation to assist in constructing these lower-income units.
This compensation can come in numerous forms, including a waiver of
fees (park, subdivision, processing, or other), exemption from utility
connection charges, expedition of permit processing, waiver or relaxation
of zoning requirements such as density, lot coverage, frontage, or height
and setback requirements, or waiver of other zoning or subdivision laws
or building codes.97 Additionally, developers may have alternatives to
constructing lower-income units along with their market-rate units, such
as erecting off-site lower-income housing, dedicating land for lowerincome units, or making cash payments that will ultimately be used to
fund the construction of lower-income units.98 Finally, in some cases, a
developer who has constructed more than the required lower-income
units in the development may receive a lower-income unit credit, which
may be applied to another development or sold or transferred to another
developer to reduce the new development’s required number of lowerincome housing units.99
Two important issues arise under mandatory inclusionary zoning
plans that do not arise under incentive programs: the denial of due
process and the taking of private property without just compensation.
When a governmental entity requires a private property owner to give up
part of his or her land, the red flags of takings and due process are raised
in a hurry. However, there are ways that municipalities can design
zoning laws to avoid such claims. As with zoning ordinances that are

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See ZIEGLER ET AL., supra note 85, at § 22.23.
See id.
See Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 284 (N.J. 1990).
ZIEGLER ET AL., supra note 85, at §§ 22.22 n.2, 22.23.
See id. at § 22.23.
See id.
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potentially exclusionary,100 those ordinances that may be challenged on
takings or due process grounds will be given more deference in the
courts when they qualify as legislative actions.101 Additionally, a
municipality may avoid takings and due process issues if it carefully
drafts its inclusionary zoning ordinance as a legislative action designed
to accomplish legitimate state objectives through legitimate means.102
Courts are generally consistent in their treatment of due process and
takings issues; a municipal ordinance will generally be upheld as not a
taking and not a denial of due process when (1) the ordinance is
established for a legitimate public purpose and is “a reasonable means to
accomplish [such] purpose” and (2) the ordinance “advance[s] a
legitimate state interest and the developer [is] not denied substantially all
economically viable use of the property.”103 Applying this test to
affordable housing, courts will generally deny due process and takings
claims because the erection of affordable housing is usually seen as a
legitimate state interest and because the required inclusion of affordable
housing still allows a developer to profit from selling market-rate units
and often times also from the affordable units.104 Most states follow this
test when a land-use ordinance does not deprive a landowner of
substantially all the value of his or her property,105 although there are
some exceptions; for example, Oregon’s recently adopted Measure 37
requires local governments to compensate landowners for any
devaluation of the fair market value of the property through a land-use
regulation.106
Another concern that arises under mandatory inclusionary zoning
ordinances is whether such statutes are an effective solution to the longterm problem of affordable housing. Some scholars argue, albeit without
empirical data, that mandatory inclusionary zoning actually makes
housing less affordable because it decreases the supply of new housing
by turning away developers who do not want to develop lower-income
housing units, correspondingly causing the demand and cost of existing
100. See supra Part IV(B)(1).
101. See Brian R. Lerman, Comment, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning—The Answer to the
Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383 (2006).
102. Id. at 394.
103. Id. at 394–95; see also, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(a court must evaluate a regulatory takings claim based on (1) the economic impact of the regulation,
(2) the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the regulatory
action).
104. See Lerman, supra note 101, at 394-95.
105. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
106. See STATE OF OREGON, VOTERS’ PAMPHLET: VOLUME 1-STATE MEASURES 103 (2004),
available at http:// www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvol1.pdf (last visited
December 30, 2006).
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housing to rise.107 Such a system can cause a chain reaction. The
municipality enacts a mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance and as a
result, developers decide not to develop in the municipality because
selling lower-income housing units is not as profitable as selling marketrate units.108 Fewer new homes are built in the municipality, making the
demand, and ultimately the price, on existing homes increase. Lowerincome persons and families are still unable to afford housing.
Ultimately, moderate-income persons and families are priced-out of
housing that would otherwise be affordable were it not for the heightened
demand on current housing.109 Proponents of inclusionary zoning,
however, argue that many housing markets already exclude low to
moderate-income residents and that increasing housing costs brought
about by existing exclusionary laws will make the situation worse unless
inclusionary techniques are instituted.110 Though this argument also lacks
supporting empirical data for its future projections, much of the
argument is historical and contains statistics on the existing state of
housing and the need to make improvements.111
Regardless of which argument a municipality agrees with it must
take into account numerous factors when enacting its housing laws,
including exclusionary and inclusionary zoning methods and their
potential consequences. If the municipality believes that inclusionary
zoning will be the best source for providing its fair share of lowerincome housing, it must decide between incentive and mandatory
inclusionary zoning. The municipality must also ensure that the
ordinance has and accomplishes a legitimate public purpose that does not
take away all economically viable use of a property owner’s land so that
the municipality avoids takings and due process challenges. Finally, a
municipality must take into account the individual state law from which
it derives its authority to zone so as to ensure that the ordinance attempts
to fulfill a legitimate state purpose.

V. MOST STATE LAWS ENCOURAGE, BUT DO NOT REQUIRE, THEIR
MUNICIPALITIES, TO ESTABLISH PLANS THAT REQUIRE LOWER-INCOME
107. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, “The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed”: How Effective are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 492 (2005) (“Cities
should only enact inclusionary zoning if the goal is to make the vast majority of housing less
affordable.”).
108. See id.
109. For an in-depth critique of mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances, see id.
110. See Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating
Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 971 (Summer 2002).
111. For an in depth look at historical statistics supporting inclusionary zoning, see id.
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DEVELOPMENTS
Municipalities that are encouraged or required to develop housing
laws must do so within the larger frame of their individual states’ laws.
While municipalities in any of the states may adopt aggressive housing
laws aimed at the construction of affordable housing, when state laws do
not establish a framework that could supersede municipal decisions
adverse to affordable housing, municipalities have little incentive to do
so. Fifteen states encourage or require their municipalities to address the
need for low-income housing generally,112 while a few other states’
housing laws are more specific and require, among other things, that
each municipality create a “housing element . . . designed to achieve the
goal of access to affordable housing to meet present and prospective
housing needs, with particular attention to low and moderate income
housing.”113 Such discussion of the housing element must usually
include, among other things, an inventory of current lower-income
housing, a projection of the stock of lower-income housing for the next
few years, an analysis of the municipality’s demographics and probable
future employment characteristics, a determination of the municipality’s
fair share of lower-income housing along with its present and prospective
housing needs, and “a consideration of the lands that are most
appropriate for construction of [lower-income] housing, including a
consideration of lands of developers who have expressed a commitment
to provide [lower-income] housing.”114
Thus, of the states that do encourage or require municipalities to
address the housing issue, most only request general attention. The
remaining few require specific attention to current and future lowerincome housing needs in the context of the municipalities’ current and
projected demographics. Though states may encourage or require
municipalities to give either general or specific attention to the housing
element, states do not generally require municipalities to enact
inclusionary zoning plans or otherwise establish mechanisms, such as
requiring sufficient incentives or an expedited permit process, to ensure
that lower-income housing is actually developed and thus do not provide

112. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-106 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-23 (2006); 310
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/25 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5248 (2006); MD. CODE
ANN. Art. 66B, § 3.05 (2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.859 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-27-8
(2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.2-6 (2005); S. C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-510 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 10-9a-403 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §4345a (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020
(2006); WIS. STAT. § 66.1001 (2005); VA. CODE. ANN. § 15.2-2224 (2006).
113. N.J. ADMIN CODE § 5:92-1.4 (2006); see also CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65, 583 (1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 2656 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177 (2006).
114. N.J. ADMIN CODE § 5:92-1.4.
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the framework necessary to ensure that affordable housing is actually
erected.
Most states have specific reasons for requiring their municipalities to
address lower-income or public housing.115 One scholar distinguishes the
approach of western states with that of eastern states, stating that the
western approach typically requires each state to address the need for
affordable housing by zoning through a comprehensive plan, “requir[ing]
more [than eastern states] from municipalities in their planning and
zoning” so that the state can more “easily implement affordable housing
requirements.”116 Eastern states, on the other hand, generally tailor their
state plans either to eliminate specific exclusionary zoning practices or to
construct lower-income housing developments.117 While requiring
municipalities to create a strong plan can create clear direction for the
future, it can also make adaptations to the plan more difficult.
Additionally, while encouraging municipalities to tailor plans to specific
exclusionary practices allows municipalities to maintain flexibility in
developing applicable ordinances, the municipalities may not recognize
the need to provide for lower-income housing. Regardless of how states
decide to incorporate the housing element into their statutory law,
whether it be to eliminate exclusionary zoning practices, to ensure that
the people working in the municipality can live where they work, or to
eliminate downtown blight and ghettos by dispersing the concentration
of lower-income housing, municipalities must come up with a plan that
addresses the need to provide affordable housing to individuals and
families with lower incomes.
Although state housing laws typically have similar goals concerning
the development of lower-income housing—ensuring that municipalities
address the current and future need for lower-income housing—the two
most specific state laws, California’s and Massachusetts’, differ greatly
on who, the municipality or the developer, has the power to ensure that
lower-income housing is developed. California’s housing laws favor a
very strong municipality, which leaves the door open for municipal plans
whereby developers with plans to develop within a municipality have
little to no say about whether they will develop lower-income housing.118
Massachusetts’ housing laws favor a very strong developer, whereby the
115. See Lerman, supra note 101, at 399.
116. Id. at 404; see also infra Part V(A) (discussing how California’s plan requires strong
municipal involvement in the planning and zoning of lower-income housing).
117. See id. at 399-404; see also infra Part V(B) (discussing how Massachusetts’ plan does not
require strong municipal involvement in the planning and zoning of lower-income housing but
instead allows the state to specifically override municipal plans that are not in the public’s best
interest with regard to such housing).
118. See infra Part V(A).
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municipality has little to no authority to limit the development of lowerincome housing.119 Typical state laws, however, do not demand a strong
hand from either the municipality or the developer. Instead, most states’
laws simply encourage municipalities and developers to work together to
develop an appropriate amount of lower-income housing, but do not
require municipalities to establish any concrete mechanisms that will
ensure the development of lower-income housing.120 Thus, while
California gives municipalities the authority to require the development
of public housing, and Massachusetts gives developers such power, the
remaining states that actually address the housing element do not have
stringent laws empowering either, and by default fall closer to the
Massachusetts standard.121 In those states, if public housing is to be
developed, developers must take the initiative because municipalities
have little incentive to ensure the development of low-income housing
once they have satisfied state requirements of addressing the lowerincome housing issue.122
A. Strong Municipal Plan: California
California’s housing laws follow the typical pattern in that they
require municipalities to include a housing element, one that addresses
the current and future needs for affordable housing, as a part of their
comprehensive zoning plans.123 In addition to the typical requirements,
the state housing laws also encourage municipalities to be active and
work aggressively with state and other local governments to accomplish
affordable housing goals by requiring municipalities to follow numerous
specific provisions designed to “facilitate and expedite the construction
of affordable housing.”124 Heeding the state laws’ requirement to be
119. See infra Part V(B).
120. See infra Part V(C).
121. Id.
122. Though Massachusetts laws do not require developers to raise a strong hand in
developing lower-income housing by threat of force, they go beyond the housing laws of the
remaining states. As most states’ housing laws encourage developers to build lower-income housing
and allow them an avenue to challenge a denial of a permit to build such housing through the court
system, Massachusetts laws allow developers to avoid such costly challenges, which can generally
be expected to deter a developer from his efforts, and go straight to a state sponsored housing
committee that can override a municipality’s decision and grant the developer an instant right to
develop lower-income housing. See infra Part V(B).
123. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65,583 (1997); see also Lerman, supra note 101, at 405-406.
124. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65,582.1 (1997) (“The Legislature finds and declares that it has
provided reforms and incentives to facilitate and expedite the construction of affordable housing.
Those reforms and incentives can be found in the following provisions:
(a) Housing element law (Article 10.6 (commencing with Section 65580) of Chapter 3).
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active and work aggressively to accomplish affordable housing goals, the
city of Napa has enacted one of the strongest municipal plans in the
United States with regard to accomplishing those housing goals.125
The City of Napa with its immense wine industry—an industry that
relies on cheap labor—has no shortage of manual laborers. The city does,
however, have a shortage of affordable housing for these manual
laborers.126 Many laborers, as well as other lower-income individuals and
families, are forced to either sacrifice other necessities of life such as
food, clothing, and insurance, or move their families outside of the city
towards more affordable housing. As these lower-income individuals and
families move away from their jobs, they are forced to commute back
into the city, contributing to other rapid-development related problems—
traffic and pollution.127 In an effort to address these problems, the city
formed a housing task force comprised of representatives from non-profit
agencies, environmental groups, religious institutions, local industries,
for-profit developers, and the local chamber of commerce.128 This task
force studied the local housing element, as required by state housing
laws,129 and recommended that the City of Napa enact an inclusionary
(b) Extension of statute of limitations in actions challenging the housing element and
brought in support of affordable housing (subdivision (d) of Section 65009).
(c) Restrictions on disapproval of housing developments (Section 65589.5).
(d) Priority for affordable housing in the allocation of water and sewer hookups (Section
65589.7).
(e) Least cost zoning law (Section 65913.1).
(f) Density bonus law (Section 65915).
(g) Second dwelling units (Sections 65852.150 and 65852.2).
(h) By-right housing, in which certain multifamily housing are designated a permitted use
(Section 65589.4).
(i) No-net-loss-in zoning density law limiting downzonings and density reductions
(Section 65863).
(j) Requiring persons who sue to halt affordable housing to pay attorney fees (Section
65914) or post a bond (Section 529.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
(k) Reduced time for action on affordable housing applications under the approval of
development permits process (Article 5 (commencing with Section 65950) of Chapter
4.5).
(l) Limiting moratoriums on multifamily housing (Section 65858).
(m) Prohibiting discrimination against affordable housing (Section 65008).
(n) California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section
12900) of Division 3).
(o) Community redevelopment law (Part 1 (commencing with Section 33000) of Division
24 of the Health and Safety Code, and in particular Sections 33334.2 and 33413).”).
125. See Lerman, supra note 101, at 399 (“Western states . . . have had more success in
implementing inclusionary programs. The western states’ approaches, especially that of the City of
Napa, illustrate the potential for inclusionary programs.” .”).
126. See Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 62 (Cal. App.
1st Dist. 2001).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65,583 (1997).
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housing ordinance modeled after the inclusionary ordinance already
enacted by Napa County.130
The City of Napa enacted two inclusionary housing ordinances
requiring all developers to dedicate ten percent of all new development,
residential and commercial, for use as lower-income housing. An
inclusionary zoning plan of this nature immediately raised obvious
takings and due process issues.131 The Home Builders Association of
Northern California filed a complaint against the City of Napa seeking to
have the housing ordinances invalidated as a violation of takings and due
process laws.132 The Home Builders Association appealed the district
court’s demurrer of its complaint and again raised takings and due
process arguments.133 In response to these arguments, the court held that
although the ordinances imposed significant burdens on developers, they
also provided significant benefits, including “eligib[ility] for expedited
processing, fee deferrals, loans or grants, and density bonuses.”134 The
challenges on takings and due process grounds were invalidated because
Napa’s ordinance allowed developers to apply for and the city to grant
waivers to the set-aside requirements.135 Because the City of Napa could
waive the ten percent requirement upon the developer’s showing that
such requirement is not justified, the housing ordinances were deemed
valid.136
Thus, California’s housing laws allow municipalities to enact
housing ordinances that require all developers to set aside a percentage
of development or pay an in lieu fee for the development of lowerincome housing.137 These inclusionary zoning laws are not unlawful
under the takings clause as long as the ordinance allows for the
municipality to waive them when circumstances make them
unnecessary.138 On paper, this appears to be the most effective state law
for ensuring that lower-income housing is developed. As developers
must develop to stay in business, and as those who develop within
certain municipalities must erect lower-income housing, California’s
housing laws do the most to ensure that lower-income housing is actually
erected.139
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Home Builders Ass’n, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 62.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 62–63.
See id. at 64.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Though critics of inclusionary zoning techniques argue that developers do not necessarily
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B. Weak Municipal Plan (Strong Developer Plan): Massachusetts
Massachusetts housing laws follow a different philosophy than
California’s; they encourage developers to take the lead in creating
public housing.140 Massachusetts encourages developers by providing an
expedited application and development process for erecting lowerincome housing that allows developers to avoid lengthy and costly delays
that typically accompany such processes.141 Massachusetts’ main housing
law, the Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act (“Chapter
40B”) was initially referred to as the Anti-Snob Zoning Act because of
the Massachusetts Legislature’s original intent to combat the urban crisis
and racial segregation (accompanied by a shortage of affordable housing
for minorities in the inner city) that was exacerbated by the 1965 passage
of the “Racial Imbalance Act”142 and other historical housing procedures
tending to make lower-income housing development a difficult task.143
have to develop within the municipalities that have inclusionary housing laws, see Benjamin Powell,
supra note 107, if states enact more specific laws that require all of their municipalities to adopt
inclusionary zoning provisions, developers will be forced to either develop under the rubric of
inclusionary zoning or else relocate their operations in a way that would drastically affect business.
Hence, though technically, developers do not have to develop within a particular municipality to stay
in business, specific state laws can eliminate or lessen the likelihood that developers will simply alter
their operations to avoid a municipality’s inclusionary techniques.
140. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1998) (Under §21 a developer can avoid
lengthy and costly delays and offset the lower profit margin traditionally associated with developing
lower-income housing with the benefits accompanying minimal administrative requirements
required under expedited permit processing and the lessened possibility for permit denial or
revocation).
141. Id.
142. See Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience with a State Legislative
Effort to Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 381, 385 (2001) (“The push for
chapter 40B began in 1967 when a group of young, liberal legislators and housing activists skillfully
seized upon the national ‘Do Something’ climate of opinion (regarding the urban crisis, racial
segregation, shortage of decent housing, inner city decline and unrest) and capitalized on the
political context in the Massachusetts legislature. The latter included overwhelmingly Democratic
control, powerful House and Senate leadership positions held by urban-based politicians, and
considerable ‘political baggage’ left over from the passage of the ‘Racial Imbalance Act’ in 1965.
That controversial Act, which mandated the correction of racial imbalance in public schools, defined
an ‘imbalanced’ school as one with more than 50% non-white enrollment; therefore, given racial
residential patterns in metropolitan areas, it effectively applied only to urban school districts.”
(internal citations omitted)).
143. Bd. of App. v. Hous. App. Comm. in Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs, 294 N.E.2d 393, 40204(Mass. 1973) (instead of requiring developers to apply for permits or variances through numerous
departments or agencies who often stand as a barrier to development of lower-income housing, such
as those governing “minimum lot size requirements, green space zoning, minimum frontage and
setback requirements, minimum floor area requirements, maximum building areas of lots, building
height limitations, inspection and permit fees”, the Act allows developers to apply to a single agency
and avoid the time, monetary, and prejudicial drawbacks that accompany the traditional development
process).
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Under Chapter 40B, a developer desiring to construct lower-income
housing need apply only to one local agency for the appropriate permit,
which must either be granted or rejected within seventy days of the initial
application.144 Permit applications that are not approved or that are
conditionally approved can be immediately appealed to the Housing
Appeals Committee, which has the authority to override any local agency
decision that is not reasonable or “consistent with the needs of the
community.”145 Out of 112 local agency decisions to deny or
conditionally deny lower-income housing permit applications, 94 were
overturned for not being consistent with the needs of the community
while only 18 were upheld.146
In the late 1960s, the towns of Hanover and Concord, Massachusetts,
were in need of lower-income housing for the elderly and for persons and
families with lower incomes.147 When two developers submitted
comprehensive permit applications to the Hanover and Concord Boards
of Appeals, each developer’s application was rejected.148 Both
developers immediately filed an appeal with the state Housing Appeals
Committee.149 Both rejections were overturned and a comprehensive
permit was granted in one instance and the Board of Appeals was
ordered to grant a permit in the other without any further hearing.150 In
both instances, the Housing Appeals Committee decided that the Boards
of Appeals’ decisions were not consistent with the housing needs of the
communities.151 When the Boards of Appeals sought review in the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, the court found that:

144. See id. at 386.
145. Id. at 386–87 (“The law also established standards for determining whether a ZBA denial
is ‘consistent with local needs,’ and by so doing effectively set an affordable housing goal, or fair
share quota or threshold, for all communities. Specifically, chapter 40B provides that developers are
not entitled to a HAC appeal, and thus a ZBA decision will stand, if any one of the following
conditions which define what “consistent with local needs” means, has been met by a community:
(1) at least 10% of its total housing stock consists of subsidized housing for low- and moderateincome households; (2) at least 1.5% of its land zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use
is used for such housing; or (3) a proposed development would result within one calendar year in the
start of construction of low- and moderate-income housing on more than 0.3% of the town’s land
zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use, or ten acres, whichever is larger. This provision
was intended to give an incentive to communities to take the initiative to develop a ‘reasonable’
amount of subsidized housing, i.e., at least 10% of their total housing, in order to become immune to
the appeal process.”).
146. See id. at 397–98. Five of the eighteen were upheld on technical grounds. Id.
147. Bd. of App. v. Hous. App. Comm. in Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs, 294 N.E.2d 393, 41923 (Mass. 1973).
148. See id. at 400.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 419–23.
151. Id.
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the Legislature’s adoption of an administrative mechanism designed to
supersede, when necessary, local restrictive requirements and
regulations, including zoning by-laws and ordinances, in order to
promote the construction of low and moderate income housing in cities
and towns is a constitutionally valid exercise of the Legislature’s
zoning power which was properly implemented in the proceedings
before us.152

Thus, Massachusetts law allows for the State Housing Committee to
override any local agency’s decision if it is not in accord with what the
state has envisioned for the housing needs of its residents.153
In contrast with California’s laws that invite municipalities to take
the leading role in developing lower-income housing, Massachusetts’
laws can eliminate the municipalities’ role completely if their decisions
are not consistent with the lower-income housing needs of the
community. Thus, Massachusetts developers are encouraged to and
supported in taking the lead in the development of lower-income
housing, while Massachusetts’ municipalities can be overruled if they do
not share the state Housing Appeals Committee’s view of local
community needs.
C. Typical Municipal Plan: Illinois
Illinois’ Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act is
representative of many other state housing laws154 in that it requires
municipalities to address the housing element, including an assessment
of the current and future needs for lower-income housing.155
Municipalities may satisfy this requirement by enacting a housing plan
that consists of the following provisions: municipalities must set a goal
of having at least fifteen percent of all new developments or
redevelopments qualify as affordable housing, an overall three percent
increase in affordable housing in the jurisdiction, or a minimum total of
ten percent of all housing in the municipality qualified as affordable
housing.156 The Act defines affordable housing as

152. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
153. See id.
154. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
155. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/25 (2005) (Under Illinois’ housing law, a state committee
determines whether each municipality must conduct the assessment of public housing needs.
Essentially, municipalities where less than ten percent of housing units are deemed “affordable” by
the state agency must enact a housing plan.).
156. See id.
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housing that has a sales price or rental amount that is within the means
of a household that may occupy moderate-income or low-income
housing. In the case of dwelling units for sale, housing that is
affordable means housing in which mortgage, amortization, taxes,
insurance, and condominium or association fees, if any, constitute no
more than 30% of the gross annual household income for a household
of the size that may occupy the unit. In the case of dwelling units for
rent, housing that is affordable means housing for which the rent and
utilities constitute no more than 30% of the gross annual household
income for a household of the size that may occupy the unit.157

The Act requires Illinois municipalities to create incentives for attracting
the development of affordable housing in their jurisdiction in order to
reach these affordable housing goals.158
Illinois’ law is typical in that it defines what a municipality must,
may, or may not do,159 but does not establish a system that adequately
encourages the development of lower-income housing.160 The Illinois
Act mandates that municipalities establish lower-income housing plans,
but does not have in place the mechanisms that will result in the actual
construction of lower-income housing. Developers can appeal a local
agency’s denial of a permit to develop lower-income housing to a state
committee similar to the process in Massachusetts.161 Unlike
Massachusetts, however, where the state committee can override a
municipality’s decision simply if the municipality has not adequately
addressed its lower-income housing needs, the Illinois state committee
cannot supersede a municipality’s decision unless a developer can show
that he or she was unfairly denied or that unreasonable conditions were
placed upon the tentative approval of the development.162
This leaves Illinois, and most other states that merely require their
municipalities to address the housing issue in general, in the exact place
where Mt. Laurel I left New Jersey, without the necessary construction
157. Id. § 67/15.
158. See id. § 67/25.
159. Id. (A municipality must enact a plan stating the current needs of affordable housing,
identifying prospective sites. A municipality may adopt certain measures such as a housing trust
fund to help finance affordable housing activities. A municipality may not enter into an
intergovernmental agreement with another municipality that has more than twenty-five percent
affordable housing in an attempt to avoid development requirements under the Act.) .).
160. See Parts V (A) and (B), discussing California’s and Massachusetts’ housing laws, which
adopt an expedited construction process for lower-income housing that goes beyond the discussion
and calculation of the need for affordable housing and establishes an accelerated framework for the
actual development of lower-income housing.
161. See id. § 67/30.
162. See id.

522

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

of lower-income housing unless a developer or municipality voluntarily
ensures such housing is developed.163 Though a typical plan may be
successful in that municipalities address the housing element in a way
that allows developers to erect affordable housing, it does not create a
specific framework expediting the process or otherwise providing
sufficient incentives to ensure such development. In contrast to
California’s state laws that require municipalities to adopt inclusionary
zoning ordinances that expedite the development of affordable housing,
and Massachusetts’ state laws that allow the state housing committee to
supersede local municipalities if it decides that the municipality’s
decisions are not consistent with its lower-income housing needs, most
states’ laws that require municipalities to address the affordable housing
issue do not establish the necessary framework to ensure that such
housing is developed.164
VI. UTAH HOUSING LAWS ARE TYPICAL AND DO NOT REQUIRE
AFFORDABLE HOUSING TO BE DEVELOPED
Though Utah appears, at first glance, to be an exception from most
states in that some of its municipalities calculate a surplus in affordable
housing, the state is not an exception from the rest of the United States
when it comes to residents actually living in public housing; many
residents qualify for lower-income housing that is not readily
available.165 Though incomes have increased by about five percent over
the last three years, housing prices have increased twenty-five to thirty
percent, leaving many residents unable to afford suitable housing.166 To

163. The first low-income housing actually developed under the Mt. Laurel doctrine was not
approved until twenty-six years after the Mt. Laurel litigation began (1997), and the initial 140-unit
townhouse development reached completion near the end of 2002, over thirty years after litigation
began. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 61, at 550.
164. See supra Part V.
165. See NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT OF REACH 2005 1 (2005),
http://www.nlihc.org/oor2005/pdf/UT.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2006); GEOFF BUTLER,
NEIGHBORHOOD LIFE CYCLE CASE STUDIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING 39 (2006),
http://www.utahhousing.org/documents/NeighborhoodLifeCycle9-06__GeoffButler.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2006) (The necessity of lower-income housing in Utah is understated by local governments
because new construction is out of the price range of lower-income persons and families. As existing
affordable houses have a slow turnover rate, lower-income persons and families are prevented from
occupying such affordable housing. “While many communities meet affordable housing targets
through existing housing stock, this often is not affordability that can be easily tapped. Most HB295
studies . . . tie most affordability to existing housing stock.”); see also, 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
67/20 (the state committee must take into account the total “number of for-sale housing units in each
local government that are affordable to” lower-income households, not just the amount of existing
units affordable to such households.”).
166. See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL., STATE
OF UTAH CONSOLIDATED PLAN 2006-2010 19, http://community.utah.gov/housing_and_
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be able to afford the average two-bedroom apartment in Utah an
individual would have to make $12.98 per hour and work forty hours per
week without any vacation.167 A current minimum wage worker,
someone who earns $5.15 per hour,168 would have to work 101 hours a
week without vacation or else join 1.5 other people earning the same
amount in order to afford the average two-bedroom apartment.169 The
State of Utah calculates that 4,342 new affordable housing units have
been needed each year for the last eight years, while only 2,621 units
were actually developed per year.170 Of those 4,342 new affordable
housing units needed each year, 625 are needed just for those families
that earn less than thirty percent of the annual median income.171 Thus,
many individuals and families in Utah must look to public housing to be
able to afford rent without sacrificing other basic needs.
A. Utah State Housing Laws
As is the case with many of the state laws already discussed, Utah
law requires each municipality to have a comprehensive plan in place
that addresses its present and future needs.172 In 1996, the Utah
Legislature passed House Bill 295, which requires municipalities to
address the housing element in their general plan.173 Municipalities adopt
comprehensive plans upon recommendations made by their planning
commissions.174 Under Utah law, it is the planning commission which
must address the housing element in its recommendation to the
municipality.175 The relevant portion of the Utah Code states the
following:
(2)(a) At a minimum, the proposed general plan, with the
community_development/OWHLF/documents/ConsolidatedPlan2006-2010.doc (last visited Feb. 7,
2006).
167. See NATIONAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING COALITION, supra note 165, at 1 (“In Utah, the
Fair Market Rent (FMR) for a two-bedroom apartment is $675. In order to afford this level of rent
and utilities, without paying more than 30% of income on housing, a household must earn $2,249
monthly or $26,989 annually.”).
168. Pending legislation contemplates an increase of minimum wage in the near future. As of
March 26, 2007, however, Federal minimum wage is $5.15.
169. See id.
170. See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL., supra
note 166, at 8.
171. See id.
172. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-401 (2005).
173. See BENJAMIN A. THOMSON, OREM DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT SERVICES,
SUMMARY REPORT & PRELIMINARY PLAN OF ACTION, AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1998).
174. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-403 (2005).
175. See id.
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accompanying maps, charts, and descriptive and explanatory matter,
shall include the planning commission’s recommendations for the
following plan elements . . . .
(iii) for cities, an estimate of the need for the development of additional
moderate income housing within the city, and a plan to provide a
realistic opportunity to meet estimated needs for additional moderate
income housing if long-term projections for land use and development
occur.
(b) In drafting the moderate income housing element, the planning
commission:
(i) shall consider the Legislature’s determination that cities should
facilitate a reasonable opportunity for a variety of housing, including
moderate income housing:
(A) to meet the needs of people desiring to live there; and
(B) to allow persons with moderate incomes to benefit from and fully
participate in all aspects of neighborhood and community life; and
(ii) may include an analysis of why the recommended means,
techniques, or combination of means and techniques provide a realistic
opportunity for the development of moderate income housing within
the planning horizon, which means or techniques may include a
recommendation to:
(A) rezone for densities necessary to assure the production of moderate
income housing;
(B) facilitate the rehabilitation or expansion of infrastructure that will
encourage the construction of moderate income housing;
(C) encourage the rehabilitation of existing uninhabitable housing stock
into moderate income housing;
(D) consider general fund subsidies to waive construction related fees
that are otherwise generally imposed by the city;
(E) consider utilization of state or federal funds or tax incentives to
promote the construction of moderate income housing;
(F) consider utilization of programs offered by the Utah Housing
Corporation within that agency’s funding capacity; and
(G) consider utilization of affordable housing programs administered
by the Department of Community and Culture.176

While the Utah Code describes its affordable housing stock as moderateincome housing and not low-income housing, municipality moderateincome housing standards are identical to HUD’s lower-income housing

176. UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9a-403 (2005).
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standard, fifty to eighty percent of the median income in the area.177
Further, the Utah Division of Housing and Community Development
estimates that only seventy-five percent of Utah municipalities have thus
complied with state requirements to develop an affordable housing
plan.178 Thus, Utah, like Illinois and most other states, is not likely to
have an increase in the amount of public housing unless developers are
insistent upon erecting such housing to the point that they are willing to
challenge municipal laws in court, and able to gain a victory, a feat not
easily accomplished in most states.179 Additionally, though the majority
of Utah’s municipalities have enacted ordinances that conform with state
housing laws, a violation of such ordinances and or laws is not easily
remedied by an expedited process but must be attacked through costly
administrative and judicial proceedings, a fact that can discourage
developers from leaving the comfort zone of traditional developing and
branching out into the area of affordable housing.180
Compared with California’s laws giving municipalities the authority
to require lower-income housing development, Massachusetts’ laws
giving such power to developers, and Illinois’ laws and most other state
laws somewhere in the middle, Utah shares most similarities with those
states in the middle. Such state laws require their municipalities to
address the housing element, but do not have in place aggressive laws to
ensure that such housing will actually be developed.181 Utah also
participates in the federal financing plans previously discussed, such as
the HOPE and the Tax Credit Program, which, though successful, do not
provide the necessary funds to house all of Utah’s lower-income
population.182 Thus, it is left to municipalities and developers to work
together if sufficient public or lower-income housing is to be
constructed.
B. Utah Municipality Laws: Provo
The city of Provo’s general plan complies with the state law
requirement to provide a moderate income housing plan and it contains
an in-depth analysis of Provo’s current and future housing needs.183
177. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 1 (2003).
178. See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL., supra
note 166, at 19.
179. See supra Part IV(B)(1).
180. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 3 (2003).
181. See supra Part V.
182. See UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ET AL., supra
note 166, at 22.
183. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 (2003).
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Provo’s plan defines moderate income housing as “housing occupied or
reserved for occupancy by households with a gross household income
equal to or less than 80% of the median gross income of [the county].”184
Based on the 2000 census, the average household size in the applicable
area185 was rounded up to four persons, making the median household
income $50,400, and 80% of that median income $40,300.186 Thus,
households of four who earned less than $40,300 per year qualified for
moderate income housing, which meant they could afford to purchase a
house for $130,900 or less or to pay rent of $940 per month or less
without going over the national recommended spending limit of thirty
percent of household income for housing.187 With specific reference to
the Utah Code, Provo’s plan contains an estimate of the existing supply
of moderate-income housing, an estimate of the need for moderateincome housing for the next five years, a survey of total residential
zoning, an evaluation of how existing zoning densities affect
opportunities for moderate-income housing, and a description of Provo’s
program to encourage an adequate supply of moderate-income
housing.188
Provo’s plan is quite different from those of other municipalities
around the nation in that it is one of the few plans that actually calculates
an overall surplus of lower-income housing.189
[D]ata shows that there are more housing units than households in the
80% to 51% and the 50% to 31% income groups. There is a shortage of
moderate-income housing in the 30% to 0% income group, but this is
to be expected. It would be difficult to find a significant amount of
housing for purchase lower than $42,700 or for rent at less than $280 a
month.190

184. Id. at 1. Although Provo’s plan describes moderate-income as fifty to eighty percent of
the area’s median income, HUD defines this same income class as low-income.
185. See id. at 2. (This statistical data was based on the previous definition of moderate
income housing, which included a comparison to other individuals and families living in the
metropolitan statistical area rather than the county).
186. See id. at 1 (including numbers based on statistics from 2002).
187. See id. at 2.
188. See id.
189. See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 3 (2003). But see GEOFF BUTLER, supra note 165, at
39 (The necessity of lower-income housing in Utah is understated by local governments).
190. Id.
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Although Provo’s plan is unique in that it does not calculate an overall
need for more lower-income housing, it is similar to plans of other
municipalities in that it does calculate a need for more lower-income
housing for households in the lowest income bracket.191 Provo’s plan for
addressing its lower-income housing needs is also unique in that its
remedy for fulfilling the housing needs of its lower-income residents is
not primarily focused on the construction of major developments but
instead focuses on limited relaxations of zoning standards.192
Provo’s plan mainly advocates the relaxation of a limited number of
zoning standards, and secondarily promotes various housing programs
and incentives that are typical of municipalities around the nation.193
Provo encourages usage of the Project Redevelopment Option, which
allows new, one-family and multi-family lower-income housing to be
built in residential and mixed-use settings. The plan also encourages
accessory apartments, manufactured homes, and cluster development
patterns, which patterns consist of efficiently clustering homes on
191. See id.
192. See id. at 8–11.
193. See id.

Income
of
$13,95
0 and
max
rent of
$280
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smaller lots with smaller driveways so as to maximize land usage in an
economy where land prices have jumped.194 The plan also calls for
incentives and tax breaks for developers of lower-income elderly and
special-needs housing.195 Finally, the plan encourages lower-income
households to use various government programs that provide subsidies to
assist those households in affording housing that is likely already on the
market.196
Thus, although Provo’s general plan is unique in at least one
aspect—the city does not calculate a pressing need for the development
of lower-income housing—its operation under the umbrella of Utah state
housing laws demonstrates that Utah’s state laws are typical of most
other states in the union; they require their municipalities to address the
housing element but do not have laws to ensure that such housing will
actually be developed.197

VII. CONCLUSION
There is a wide-spread need for additional public housing throughout
the United States. Federal and state governments have introduced and
implemented numerous plans to aid in developing public or lowerincome housing. Though public housing issues are being widely
addressed, few state laws or municipal plans put in the “steel” that the
New Jersey’s Supreme Court envisioned in the Mt. Laurel II decision.198
Most states and municipalities discuss the need for lower-income
housing and encourage the use of incentives and programs, but do
nothing in the way of actually requiring the development of lowerincome housing. A growing number of states require their municipalities
to adopt incentive or inclusionary zoning techniques or plans, and two
states in particular, Massachusetts and California, have aggressive plans
in place to ensure that lower-income housing is erected by allowing
developers an expedited process under which erecting affordable housing
becomes or remains a viable option. Most other states, including Illinois
and Utah, follow a pattern of requiring their municipalities to address the
housing element. However, instead of establishing a framework under
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See id.
See PROVO, UT., GEN. PLAN CH. 4 9–11 (2003).
See id. at 11.
See id.; supra Part VI.
Id.
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which municipalities or developers can ensure that development within a
municipality will contain affordable housing, they sit back and wait for
municipalities and developers to work together towards the actual
development of lower-income housing. Thus, although there are
numerous programs aimed at increasing the amount of public housing,
and although states have the ability to establish laws requiring the
development of lower-income housing, aside from two exceptions,
California and Massachusetts, state and municipal laws do not have a
major effect on the development of lower-income housing.
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